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Abstract
The allure of an environmentally benign, abundant, and cost-eﬀ  ective energy source 
has led an increasing number of industrialized countries to back public ﬁ  nancing of 
renewable energies. Germany’s experience with renewable energy promotion is often 
cited as a model to be replicated elsewhere, being based on a combination of far-
reaching energy and environmental laws that stretch back nearly two decades. This 
paper critically reviews the current centerpiece of this eﬀ  ort, the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG), focusing on its costs and the associated implications for job cre-
ation and climate protection. We argue that German renewable energy policy, and in 
particular the adopted feed-in tariﬀ   scheme, has failed to harness the market incen-
tives needed to ensure a viable and cost-eﬀ  ective introduction of renewable ener-
gies into the country’s energy portfolio. To the contrary, the government’s support 
mechanisms have in many respects subverted these incentives, resulting in massive 
expenditures that show little long-term promise for stimulating the economy, protect-
ing the environment, or increasing energy security.
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1. Introduction 
The allure of an environmentally benign, abundant, and cost-effective energy source has 
led an increasing number of industrialized countries to back public financing of renewable 
energies. For Europe, the European Commission set a target of 20% for the share of 
electricity from renewable sources by 2020, which is intended to foster compliance with 
international agreements on greenhouse gas emission reductions
3 and to provide 
opportunities for employment and regional development (EC 2009:16). These goals are 
shared by the German Environment Ministry, which regards renewables as a central pillar 
in efforts to protect the climate, reduce import dependency, and safeguard jobs (BMU 
2008:8). 
A closer look at Germany’s experience, however, whose history of public support 
for renewable electricity production stretches back nearly two decades, suggests that 
such emphasis is misplaced. This paper critically reviews the current centerpiece of the 
German promotion of renewable energy technologies, the Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(EEG), focusing on its cost and the associated implications for job creation and emissions 
reductions. The paper will show that, by and large, government policy has failed to 
harness the market incentives needed to ensure a viable and cost-effective introduction 
of renewable energies into Germany’s energy portfolio. To the contrary, the 
government’s support mechanisms have in many respects subverted these incentives, 
resulting in massive expenditures that show little long-term promise for stimulating the 
economy, protecting the environment, or increasing energy security.  
The following section describes Germany’s growth of electricity production from 
wind power, photovoltaics (PV) and biomass, the predominant renewable energy sources, 
together accounting for about 90% of supported renewable electricity production in 2008 
(BMU 2009a). Section 3 presents cost estimates of Germany’s subsidization of PV 
modules and wind power plants that were installed between 2000 and 2008, thereby 
providing for an impression of the resulting long-lasting burden on German electricity 
consumers. In Section 4, we assess the potential benefits of Germany’s subsidization 
scheme for the global climate, employment, energy security, and technological 
innovation. The last section summarizes and concludes. 
2. Germany’s Promotion of Renewable Technologies 
Through generous financial support, Germany has dramatically increased the electricity 
production from renewable technologies since the beginning of this century (IEA 
2007:65). With a share of about 15% of total electricity production in 2008 (Schiffer 
2009:58), Germany has more than doubled its renewable electricity production since 
2000 and has already significantly exceeded its minimum target of 12.5% set for 2010. 
                                                 
3 The Commission has stipulated a particularly ambitious target for Germany, aiming to triple the share of 
renewable sources in the final energy mix from 5.8% in 2005 to 18.0% in 2020.   5
This increase came at the expense of conventional electricity production, whereby 
nuclear power experienced the largest relative loss between 2000 and 2008 (Figure 1). 
Currently, wind power is the most important of the supported renewable energy 
technologies: In 2008, the estimated share of wind power in Germany’s electricity 
production amounted to 6.3% (Figure  1), followed by biomass-based electricity 
generation and water power, whose shares were around 3.6% and 3.1%, respectively. In 
contrast, the amount of electricity produced through solar photovoltaics (PV) was 
negligible: Its share was as low as 0.6% in 2008.  
Figure 1: Gross Electricity Production in Germany in 2000 and 2008 (AGEB 
2009, BMU 2009a) 
 
The substantial contribution of renewable energy technologies to Germany’s 
electricity production is primarily a consequence of a subsidy policy based on feed-in 
tariffs that was established in 1991, when Germany’s Electricity Feed-in Law went into 
force. Under this law, utilities were obliged to accept and remunerate the feed-in of 
“green” electricity at 90 percent of the retail rate of electricity, considerably exceeding 
the cost of conventional electricity generation. An important consequence of this 
regulation was that feed-in tariffs shrank with the electricity prices in the aftermath of 
the liberalization of European electricity markets in 1998.  
With the introduction of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), the support 
regime was amended in 2000 to guarantee stable feed-in tariffs for up to twenty years, 
thereby providing for favourable conditions for investments in “green” electricity 
production over the long term. Given the premature over-compliance with the target for 
2010, it is not surprising that Germany’s EEG is widely considered to be very successful 
in terms of increasing green electricity shares, and has thus been adopted by numerous 
other countries, including France, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic (Voosen 2009).  
Under the EEG regime, utilities are obliged to accept the delivery of power from 
independent producers of renewable electricity into their own grid, thereby paying   6
technology-specific feed-in tariffs far above their production cost of 2 to 7  Cents per 
kilowatt hour (kWh). With a feed-in tariff of 43 Cents per kWh in 2009, solar electricity is 
guaranteed by far the largest financial support among all renewable energy technologies 
(Table 1). Currently, the feed-in tariff for PV is more than eight times higher than the 
electricity price at the power exchange (Table A1) and more than four times the feed-in 
tariff paid for electricity produced by on-shore wind turbines (Table 1).  
This high support for solar electricity is necessary for establishing a market 
foothold, with the still low technical efficiencies of PV modules and the unfavorable 
geographical location of Germany being among a multitude of reasons for solar 
electricity’s grave lack of competitiveness. With the exception of electricity production 
from large water power stations, other sources of green electricity are also heavily 
dependent on the economic support stipulated by the EEG. Even on-shore wind, widely 
regarded as a mature technology, requires feed-in tariffs that exceed the per kWh cost of 
conventional electricity by up to 300% to remain competitive. 
 
Table 1: Technology-Specific Feed-in Tariffs in Euro Cents per kWh 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Wind  on-shore  9.10 9.10 9.00 8.90 8.70 8.53 8.36 8.19 8.03 9.20 
Wind  off-shore  9.10 9.10 9.00 8.90 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 8.92  15.00 
Photovoltaics  50.62 50.62 48.09 45.69 50.58 54.53 51.80 49.21 46.75 43.01 
Biomass  10.23 10.23 10.13 10.03 14.00 13.77 13.54 13.32 13.10 14.70 
Mean  Tariff  8.50 8.69 8.91 9.16 9.29  10.00  10.88  11.36  12.25  -- 
Sources: BDEW (2001 through 2009), EEG (2000, 2004, 2009) 
 
While utilities are legally obliged to accept and remunerate the feed-in of green 
electricity, it is ultimately the industrial and private consumers who have to bear the cost 
through increased electricity prices. In 2008, the price mark-up due to the subsidization 
of green electricity was about 1.5 Cent per kWh, that is, roughly 7.5% of the average 
household electricity prices of about 20 Cents per kWh. This price mark-up results from 
dividing the overall amount of feed-in tariffs of about 9 Bn € (US $12.7 Bn) reported in 
Table 2 by the overall electricity consumption of 617 Bn kWh (AGEB 2009:22). 
Although PV accounted for only 6.2% of renewable electricity production, it is the 
most privileged technology in terms of highest support per kWh, appropriating 24.6% of 
the overall feed-in tariffs in 2008 (Table 2). In contrast, the share of hydro power in 
renewable energy production is 7.0%, but it received only 4.2% of total feed-in tariffs in 
2008. Overall, the level of feed-in tariffs increased nearly six-fold between 2001 and 
2008, from almost 1.6 to about 9 Bn €.  
Some sense for the sheer magnitude of this figure can be gleaned from a 
comparison with the government’s investment in R&D for renewable energies, which we   7
will later argue to be a considerably more cost-effective means of fostering efficiency 
improvements. In 2007, this investment amounted to 211.1  Mio.  € (BMWi 2009), an 
inconsequential 3% of the total feed-in tariffs of 7.59 Bn € in the same year. 
 
Table 2: Share of Feed-in Tariff Expenditures Allocated to Major Technologies 
 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Wind  Power  -  64.5% 65.1% 63.7%  54.3% 47.1% 44.5% 39.5% 
Biomass  -  10.4% 12.5% 14.1%  17.7% 23.0% 27.4% 29.9% 
Photovoltaics  -  3.7%  5.9%  7.8%  15.1% 20.3% 20.2% 24.6% 
Total in Bn €  1.58  2.23  2.61  3.61  4.40  5.61  7.59  9.02 
Sources: BDEW (2001 through 2009) and own calculations.  
 
Along with the significant increase in total tariffs, there was an enormous growth 
in renewable energy production capacities over the past decade, particularly of wind 
power (Figure 2). Apart from the U.S., Germany has the largest wind power capacities 
globally, being almost 24,000 Megawatt (MW) in 2008 (Figure 3). This is one sixth of the 
overall power capacity of about 150,000 MW in Germany. With respect to PV, Germany’s 
capacity outstrips that of any other country, followed by Spain in second position. In fact, 
the annual installation of PV capacities almost tripled in the last five years. With 
1,500 MW of new installations in 2008, the German market accounted for 42% of the 
global PV business (REN21 2009:24).  
Given the tremendous growth illustrated by Figure 2 and Table 3, it is no wonder 
that Germany’s support scheme based on feed-in tariffs is globally regarded as a great 
success and that similar promoting instruments for renewable technologies have been 
implemented elsewhere. The critical issue that will be assessed in the subsequent 
sections is, however, whether Germany’s renewable support scheme is also cost-
effective.  
   8














Table 3: Solar Electricity Capacities and Production in Germany  
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Capacity  Installed,  MW  100  178  258  408  1,018 1,881 2,711 3,811 5,311 
Annual Increase, MW  -  78  80  150  610  863  830  1,100  1,500 
Annual Solar Cell 
Production in Germany 
16 33 54 98  187 319 530 842  1,450 
Sources: Production: BMU (2009a), Capacity Installed: BMU (2009a), German Cell Production: BSW (2009). 
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3. Long-Lasting Consequences for Electricity Consumers  
The 2009 amendment to Germany’s EEG codifies the continued extension of generous 
financial support for renewable energy technologies over the next decades, with each 
newly established plant commonly being granted a 20-year period of fixed feed-in tariffs 
  already an original feature of the EEG when it was enacted in 2000. Hence, in contrast 
to other subsidy regimes, such as the support of agricultural production under the EU’s 
notoriously protective Common Agricultural Policy, the EEG will have long-lasting 
consequences. Even if the subsidization regime had ended in 2008, electricity consumers 
would still be saddled with charges until 2028 (Figure 4). Most disconcertingly, with each 
year the program is extended, the annual amount of feed-in tariffs for PV increases 
considerably because of the substantial addition of new cohorts of modules receiving the 
subsidy, as is displayed in Figure 4 for the case of extending the program to 2010.  
In quantifying the extent of the overall burden, we focus on the total net cost of 
subsidizing electricity production by wind power plants and PV modules both for those 
plants and modules that were already installed between 2000 and 2008 and for those 
that may be added in 2009 and 2010. Costs incurred from support of biomass are also 
substantial, but their quantification is precluded by a highly complex schedule of feed-in 
tariffs that depend on the concrete technology applied. Moreover, biomass energy 
generation is widely distributed across a large number of small plants for which no 
centralized data repository exists. 
Figure 4: Annual Amount of Feed-in Tariffs for PV for the cohorts 2000 through 
2008 
 
Any assessment of the real net cost induced by subsidizing renewable 
technologies requires information on the volume of green electricity generation, 
technology-specific feed-in tariffs, as well as conventional electricity prices, with the 
specific net cost per kWh being calculated by taking the difference between technology-
specific feed-in tariffs and market prices at the power exchange. Our estimates are based 
on the past electricity production figures for wind and solar electricity for the years 2000 
through 2008 and on forecasts of future capacity growth originating from a recent PV   10
study (SARASIN 2007) and a study by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU 2009a). The appendix presents the tables used 
for our detailed calculations and provides some explanation of their derivation (see also 
Frondel, Ritter, Schmidt 2008). Past and future market prices for electricity were taken 
from the “high price scenario” assumed by NITSCH et al. (2005), a study on the future 
development of renewable energy technologies in Germany. 
This price scenario appears to be realistic from the current perspective: real base-
load prices are expected to rise from 4.91 Cents per kWh in 2010 (in prices of 2007) to 
6.34 Cents per kWh in 2020 (see Table A1). Uncertainties about future electricity prices, 
however, are hardly critical for the magnitude of our cost estimates, given the large 
differences between market prices of electricity and, specifically, of the feed-in tariffs for 
PV, which are as high as 43 Cents per kWh in 2009 (Table A 1). 
3.1 Net Cost of Promoting PV 
Taking these assumptions and the legal regulations into account and assuming an 
inflation rate of 2%, which is slightly lower than the average rate since the German 
reunification, the real net cost for all modules installed between 2000 and 2008 account 
for about 35  Bn  € (in prices of 2007). Future PV installations in 2009 and 2010 may 
cause further real cost worth 18.3 Bn € (Table 4). Adding both figures yields a total of 
53.3 Bn € for PV alone.  
Table 4: Net Cost of Promoting PV 
 Annual 
Increase 
Nominal Specific Net Cost  Cumulated Net Cost 
   1
st year  20
th year  Nominal  Real 
  Mio kWh  € Cents/kWh  € Cents/kWh  Bn €  Bn €2007 
2000 64  47.99  42.49  0.581  0.559 
2001 52  47.94  42.15  0.469  0.442 
2002 72  45.36  39.33  0.609  0.563 
2003 125  42.90  36.63  0.989  0.897 
2004 244  47.74  41.21  2.152  1.913 
2005 725  50.23  44.85  6.919  6.027 
2006 938  47.30  41.78  8.385  7.164 
2007 1,280  44.50  38.86  10.705  8.969 
2008 1,310  41.82  36.05  10.282  8.409 
Total burden for past installations:  41.091  34.943 
2009 1,600  37.85  31.96  11.269  9.032 
2010 1,880  34.16  28.15  11.837  9.296 
Total burden at the end of 2010:  64.197  53.272 
Note: Sources of Column 1: 2000-2008: BMU (2009a), 2009-2010: SARASIN (2007). Columns 2 and 3: 
Differences between feed-in tariffs and market price for the first and the 20th year, respectively. Column 4: 
Nominal figures of Column 5, using an inflation rate of 2%. Column 5: Last row of Table A2 in the Appendix.   11
3.2 Net Cost of Promoting Wind Power 
The promotion rules for wind power are more subtle than those for PV. While wind 
energy converters are also granted a 20 year-period of subsidization, the feed-in tariffs 
are not necessarily fixed over 20  years. In the first 5  years after instalment, each 
converter receives a relatively high feed-in tariff currently amounting to 9.2 Cents per 
kWh (Table  A1), whereas in the following 15  years the tariff per kWh may be 
considerably less, depending on the effectiveness of the individual converter. If a 
converter’s electricity output turns out to be low, which is actually the rule rather than 
the exception, the period of high tariffs can easily stretch to the whole 20  years of 
subsidization.  
As there is no information about how large the share of converters is that are 
given a prolonged period of high tariffs, in what follows, we calculate both the upper and 
lower bounds of the net cost of wind electricity generation (Tables 5 and 6). Turning first 
to the upper-bound case, the net cost of the converters installed between 2000 and 2008 
amounts to 19.8 Bn € in real terms if all wind converters were to receive the elevated 
initial feed-in tariff for 20 years. Future installations in 2009 and 2010 may cause further 
real cost, so that the wind power subsidies would total 20.5 Bn € if the EEG subsidization 
were to be abolished at the end of 2010.  
Table 5: Net Cost of Promoting Wind Power if elevated tariff holds for 20 years 
 Annual 
Increase 
Nominal Specific Net Cost  Cumulated Net Cost 
   1
st year  20
th year  Nominal  Real 
  Bn. kWh  € Cents/kWh  € Cents/kWh  Bn €  Bn €2007 
2000 7.55  6.47  0.97  5.839  5.884 
2001 2.96  6.42  0.63  2.116  2.100 
2002 5.28  6.27  0.24  3.347  3.281 
2003 3.07  6.11  0.00  1.698  1.645 
2004 6.65  5.86  0.00  3.032  2.906 
2005 1.72  4.23  0.00  0.637  0.603 
2006 3.48  3.86  0.00  1.056  0.990 
2007 8.79  3.48  0.00  2.134  1.982 
2008 2.23  3.10  0.00  0.423  0.389 
Total burden for past installations:  20.282  19.780 
2009 1.69  4.04  0.00  0.508  0.450 
2010 1.38  3.70  0.00  0.341  0.299 
Total burden at the end of 2010:  21.131  20.529 
Note: Sources of Column 1: 2000-2008: BMU (2009a), 2009-2010: SARASIN (2007), Columns 2 and 3: 
Differences between feed-in tariffs and market price for the first and the 20th year, respectively. Column 4: 
Nominal figures of Column 5.Column 5: Last row of Table A2 in the Appendix.   12
Note that, given the assumed price scenario, electricity prices will eventually 
exceed the feed-in tariffs for wind power, resulting in zero net costs. Referencing the 
year 2002, for example, the difference between the feed-in tariff for wind converters 
installed in that year and electricity prices was 6.27 Cents per kWh (Column 2, Table 5). 
Twenty years hence, in 2021, the difference between the feed-in tariff for these same 
converters and future conventional electricity costs is projected to be just 0.24  Cents 
(Column  3, Table  5). By 2022, wind converters that had been installed 2003 are 
expected to be “competitive” in the sense that feed-in tariffs are then lower than the 
assumed price of electricity. As a consequence, investors in wind power converters may 
contemplate selling electricity at the power exchange rather than accepting the then 
lower tariffs.  
 




Nominal Specific Net Cost  Cumulated Net Cost 
   1
st year  20
th year  Nominal  Real 
  Mio kWh  € Cents/kWh  € Cents/kWh  Bn €  Bn €2007 
2000 7.55  6.47  0.00  3.072  3.320 
2001 2.96  6.42  0.00  1.099  1.171 
2002 5.28  6.27  0.00  1.719  1.808 
2003 3.07  6.11  0.00  0.867  0.899 
2004 6.65  5.86  0.00  1.505  1.540 
2005 1.72  4.23  0.00  0.327  0.328 
2006 3.48  3.86  0.00  0.595  0.585 
2007 8.79  3.48  0.00  1.323  1.276 
2008 2.23  3.10  0.00  0.290  0.274 
Total burden for past installations:  10.797  11.201 
2009 1.69  4.04  0.00  0.297  0.275 
2010 1.38  3.70  0.00  0.216  0.196 
Total burden at the end of 2010:  11.310  11.672 
Note: Sources of Column 1: 2000-2008: BMU (2009a), 2009-2010: BMU (2008), Columns 2 and 3: 
Differences between feed-in tariffs and market price for the first and the 20th year, respectively. Column 4: 
Nominal figures of Column 5.Column 5: Last row of Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
Should wind converters receive the elevated feed-in tariff for only the first five 
years, tariffs will reach the electricity price level even earlier. In this lower-bound case, 
the wind converters installed in 2008 are expected to induce no further cost from 2013 
onwards. Accordingly, the total sum of net cost is smaller than in the case of 20 years of 
elevated feed-in tariffs, amounting to some 11.2  Bn  € in real terms for all converters 
installed between 2000 and 2008. Future installations in 2009 and 2010 may further   13
increase real cost, so that the wind power subsidies may total 11.7 Bn € in real terms, 
i.e. US $16.6 Bn, at the end of 2010 (Table 6). 
In any case, with cumulated real cost ranging between about 11.2 and 19.8 Bn € 
in 2008, the net cost of promoting wind power is substantially lower than the promotion 
of PV, whose net cost adds up to much more than 35 Bn € so far and can be expected to 
rise dramatically. Given the drastic price drop of PV modules of more than 30 % within 
the first half of 2009, the net cost for subsidizing PV may increase tremendously unless 
feed-in tariffs are not diminished accordingly in the coming years, with a sky-rocketing 
demand from Germany as a likely consequence.  
Yet, in sharp contrast to the cost of subsidizing PV, which is significantly higher 
than for wind power, the amount of solar electricity produced is considerably smaller: 
Our cost estimates for PV modules installed between 2000 and 2008 are based on an 
overall solar electricity production of 96  Bn  kWh during the 20 years of subsidization, 
while the wind converters installed in the same period of time produce 835 Bn kWh. 
3.3 Cost-Effective Climate Protection? 
The estimates presented in the previous section clearly demonstrate that producing 
electricity on the basis of renewable energy technologies is extremely costly. As a 
consequence, these technologies are far from being cost-effective climate protection 
measures. In fact, PV is among the most expensive greenhouse gas abatement options: 
Given the net cost of 41.82  Cents/kWh for modules installed in 2008 (Table  4), and 
assuming that PV displaces conventional electricity generated from a mixture of gas and 
hard coal with an emissions factor of 0.584 kg carbon dioxide (CO2) per kWh (Nitsch et 
al. 2005:66), then dividing the two figures yields abatement costs that are as high as 
716 € per tonne.  
The magnitude of this abatement cost estimate is in accordance with the IEA’s 
(2007:74) even larger figure of around 1,000  € per  tonne, which results from the 
assumption that PV replaces gas-fired electricity generation. Irrespective of the concrete 
assumption about the fuel base of the displaced conventional electricity generation, 
abatement cost estimates are dramatically larger than the current prices of CO2 emission 
certificates: Since the establishment of the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) in 
2005, the price of certificates has never exceeded 30 € per tonne of CO2. 
Although wind energy receives considerably less feed-in tariffs than PV, it is by no 
means a cost-effective way of CO2 abatement. Assuming the same emission factor of 
0.584 kg CO2/kWh as above, and given the net cost for wind of 3.10 Cents/kWh in 2008 
(Table 6), the abatement cost approximate 54 € per tonne. While cheaper than PV, this 
cost is still more than threefold the current price of certificates in the ETS. In short, from 
an environmental perspective, it would be economically much more efficient if 
greenhouse gas emissions were to be curbed via the ETS, rather than by subsidizing   14
renewable energy technologies such as PV and wind power. After all, it is for efficiency 
reasons that emissions trading is among the most preferred policy instruments for the 
abatement of greenhouse gases in the economic literature (Bonus 1998:7). 
4 Impacts of Germany’s Renewables Promotion 
Given the substantial cost associated with Germany’s promotion of renewable 
technologies, one would expect significantly positive impacts on the environment and 
economic prosperity. Unfortunately, the mechanism by which Germany promotes 
renewable technologies confers no such benefits.  
4.1 Climate Impact 
With respect to climate impacts, the prevailing coexistence of the EEG and the ETS 
means that the increased use of renewable energy technologies attains no additional 
emission reductions beyond those achieved by ETS alone. In fact, the promotion of 
renewable energy technologies ceteris paribus reduces the emissions of the electricity 
sector so that obsolete certificates can be sold to other industry sectors that are involved 
in the ETS. As a result of the establishment of the ETS in 2005, the EEG’s true effect is 
merely a shift, rather than a reduction, in the volume of emissions: Other sectors that 
are also involved in the ETS emit more than otherwise, thereby outweighing those 
emission savings in the electricity sector that are induced by the EEG (BMWA 2004:8).  
In the end, cheaper alternative abatement options are not realized that would 
have been pursued in the counterfactual situation without EEG: Very expensive 
abatement options such as the generation of solar electricity simply lead to the crowding 
out of cheaper alternatives. In other words, since the establishment of the ETS in 2005, 
the EEG’s net climate effect has been equal to zero
4. 
These theoretical arguments are substantiated by the numerical analysis of Traber 
and Kemfert (2009:155), who find that while the CO2 emissions in Germany’s electricity 
sector are reduced substantially, the emissions are hardly altered at the European scale 
by Germany’s EEG. This is due to the fact that Germany’s electricity production from 
renewable technologies mitigates the need for emission reductions in other countries that 
participate in the ETS regime, thereby significantly lowering CO2 certificate prices by 
15% relative to the situation without EEG (Traber, Kemfert 2009:169). In essence, this 
permit price effect would lead to an emission level that would be higher than otherwise if 
it were not outweighed by the substitution effect, that is, the crowding out of 
conventional electricity production through CO2-free green technologies.  
                                                 
4 Ultimately, this is because the ETS enforces a binding carbon dioxide emissions cap. It is frequently argued 
that if the abatement effects of any future promotion of renewable energy technologies have been anticipated 
and included in the then more ambitious emission cap than otherwise, as is done by the European Commission 
for the third trading period (2013-2020), the promotion of renewables nevertheless exerts a greenhouse gas 
effect. This is not true: ETS alone ensures the compliance with the more ambitious emission cap, even if the 
renewable promotion were to be abolished immediately.    15
4.2 Electricity Prices 
While the EEG’s net impact on the European emission level is thus virtually negligible, it 
increases the consumer prices for electricity in Germany by three percent according to 
the study of Traber and Kemfert (2009:170). Producer prices, on the other hand, are 
decreased by eight percent in Germany and by five percent on average in the EU25. As a 
result, the profits of the majority of the large European utilities are diminished 
substantially, most notably those of the four dominant German electricity producers. The 
numerical results indicate that Vattenfall’s, Eon’s, and RWE’s profits are lowered by about 
20%, with ENBW’s profit loss being seven percent.  
Only those utilities that are operating in non-neighbouring countries, such as 
Spain or Italy, and whose electricity production is carbon-intensive, benefit from 
Germany’s EEG, as they face lower certificate prices, but do not suffer from a crowding 
out of conventional production through Germany’s green electricity generation. This is 
why Germany’s EEG increases the profits of Italy’s Enel and Spain’s Endesa by 9% and 
16%, respectively (Traber, Kemfert 2009:172). 
4.3 Employment Effects 
Renewable energy promotion is frequently justified by the associated impacts on job 
creation. Referring to renewables as a “job motor for Germany,” a publication from the 
Environmental Ministry (BMU) reports a 55% increase in the total number of “green” jobs 
since 2004, rising to 249,300 by 2007 (BMU 2008b:31). This assessment is repeated in a 
BMU-commissioned report that breaks down these figures by energy technology 
(O’Sullivan et al. 2009:9). As depicted in Figure 4, gross employment growth in the solar 
industry, comprising the photovoltaics and solar collector sectors, has been particularly 
pronounced, rising by nearly two-fold since 2004 to reach about 74,000 jobs in 2008. 
Given sustained growth in international demand for renewable energy and an attractive 
production environment in Germany, the BMU expects these trends to continue: by 2020, 
upwards of 400,000 jobs are projected in the renewables sector (BMU 2008b:31). 
While such projections convey seemingly impressive prospects for gross 
employment growth, they obscure the broader implications for economic welfare by 
omitting any accounting of off-setting impacts. The most immediate of these impacts are 
job losses that result from the crowding out of cheaper forms of conventional energy 
generation, along with indirect impacts on upstream industries. Additional job losses will 
arise from the drain on economic activity precipitated by higher electricity prices. In this 
regard, even though the majority of the German population embraces renewable energy 
technologies, two important aspects must be taken into account. First, the private 
consumers’ overall loss of purchasing power due to higher electricity prices adds up to 
billions of Euros. Second, with the exception of the preferentially treated energy-
intensive firms, the total investments of industrial energy consumers may be   16
substantially lower. Hence, by constraining the budgets of private and industrial 
consumers, increased prices ultimately divert funds from alternative, possibly more 
beneficial, investments. The resulting loss in purchasing power and investment capital 
causes negative employment effects in other sectors (BMU 2006:3), casting doubt on 
whether the EEG’s employment effects are positive at all.  
 





The latest BMU (2009b:36) report acknowledges these cost considerations, and 
states that “the goal of environmental protection is not primarily to create as many jobs 
as possible, but rather to reach environmental goals efficiently, that is, at the lowest 
possible cost to the overall economy”. The same report, however, contorts its own logic 
with the claim that an added benefit of environmental protection is net job creation, 
because the associated reallocation of resources is typically channelled to labor-intensive 
renewable sectors (BMU 2009b:36). Such conflating of labor-intensive energy provision 
with efficient climate protection clouds much of the discussion on the economic merits of 
renewable energy. In this regard, as Michaels and Murphy (2009) note, proponents of 
renewable energies often regard the requirement for more workers to produce a given 
amount of energy as a benefit, failing to recognize that this lowers the output potential of 
the economy and is hence counterproductive to net job creation.  
Several recent investigations of the German experience support such skepticism. 
Taking account of adverse investment and crowding-out effects, both the IWH (2004)   17
and RWI (2004) find negligible employment impacts. Another analysis draws the 
conclusion that despite initially positive impacts, the long-term employment effects of the 
promotion of energy technologies such as wind and solar power systems are negative 
(BEI 2003:41). Similar results are attained by Fahl et al. (2005), as well as Pfaffenberger 
(2006) and Hillebrand et al. (2006). The latter analysis, for example, finds an initially 
expansive effect on net employment from renewable energy promotion resulting from 
additional investments. By 2010, however, this gives way to a contractive effect as the 
production costs of power increase.  
In contrast, a study commissioned by the BMU (2006:9) comes to the conclusion 
that the EEG’s net employment effect is the creation of up to 56,000 jobs until 2020. This 
same study, however, emphasizes that positive employment effects critically depend on a 
robust foreign trade of renewable energy technologies (BMU 2006:7). Whether 
favourable conditions on the international market prevail for PV, for example, is highly 
questionable, particularly given negligible or even negative net exports in recent years. 
While the imports totaled 1.44 Bn €, the exports merely accounted for 0.2 Bn € (BMU 
2006:61). Actually, a substantial share of all PV modules installed in Germany originated 
from imports (BMU 2006:62), most notably from Japan and China. In 2005, the domestic 
production of modules was particularly low compared with domestic demand. With 319 
MW, domestic production only provided for 32% of the new capacity installed in Germany 
(Table  3). In 2006 and 2007, almost half of Germany’s PV demand was covered by 
imports (Sarasin 2007:19, Table 1). Recent newspaper articles report that the situation 
remains dire, with the German solar industry facing unprecedented competition from 
cheaper Asian imports.  
Hence, any result other than a negative net employment balance of the German 
PV promotion would be surprising. In contrast, we would expect massive employment 
effects in export countries such as China, since these countries do not suffer from the 
EEG’s crowding-out effects, nor from negative income effects. In the end, Germany’s PV 
promotion has become a subsidization regime that, on a per-capita basis, has reached a 
very high level that by far exceeds average wages: Given our net cost estimate of about 
8.4 Bn € for 2008 reported in Table 4, per-capita capita subsidies turn out to be as high 
as 175,000 € (US $ 257,400), if indeed 48,000 people were employed in the PV sector 
(BSW Solar 2009). 
Even this large figure, however, likely underestimates the true cost of subsidizing 
employment in this manner, because the new green jobs are filled by workers who were 
previously employed (Michaels, Murphy 2009:3). Hence, the gross employment effect is 
overestimated. Moreover, given that the green technology sector needs medium- and 
high-skilled workers, which have been seriously lacking in Germany in recent years, 
there is strong competition for such employees, thereby casting further doubt on the net 
employment effects of the EEG. Finally, it is frequently ignored that other industries, not   18
favored by green subsidies, must draw on a pool of unemployed workers reduced by the 
EEG, so that job creation in “non-green” sectors may be lower than it otherwise would 
have been (Michaels, Murphy 2009:3). 
4.4 Energy Security 
Increased energy security from decreased reliance on fuel imports is another common 
refrain in support of renewable energy promotion, but one that is predicated on an 
abundance of sun and wind. As such conditions are highly intermittent in Germany, back-
up energy systems that use fossil fuels must consequently be in place to ensure against 
blackouts. Not only is the maintenance of such systems costly – amounting to some 
590 Mio. € in 2006 (Erdmann 2008:32) – but any increased energy security afforded by 
PV and wind is undermined by reliance on fossil fuel sources – principally gas – that must 
be imported to meet domestic demand. With some 36% of gas imports originating from 
Russia (Frondel, Schmidt 2009), a country that has not proven to be a reliable trading 
partner in recent years, the notion of improved energy security is further called into 
doubt. 
4.5 Technological Innovation 
An equally untenable argument points to the alleged long term returns that accrue from 
establishing an early foothold in the renewable energy market. According to this 
argument, the support afforded by the EEG allows young firms to expand their 
production capacities and gain familiarity with renewable technologies, thereby giving 
them a competitive advantage as the market continues to grow. Progress on this front, 
however, is critically dependent on creating the incentives conducive to the innovation of 
better products and production processes.  
In this regard, the incentives built into the EEG actually stifle innovation by 
granting a differentiated system of subsidies that compensates each energy technology 
according to its lack of competitiveness. This allowed PV to become the big winner in the 
unlevel playing field thereby created, although it is the most expensive and, hence, most 
subsidized renewable energy. Rather than affording PV a tremendous advantage, it would 
make more sense to extend a uniform subsidy per kWh of electricity from renewables. 
This would harness market forces, rather than political lobbying, to determine which 
types of renewables could best compete with conventional energy sources. 
An additional distortionary feature of the EEG is a degressive system of subsidy 
rates that decrease incrementally, usually by 5% each year. Although this degression 
was introduced to create incentives to save cost and innovate, it instead does just the 
opposite by encouraging the immediate implementation of existing technology. Doing so, 
helps investors to secure today’s favourable subsidy for the next 20 years at an unvaried 
level, free from the imperative of modernizing with the latest technology. One   19
manifestation of this perverse incentive is bottlenecks in the production of silicium solar 
cells, whose production cost are a multiple of those of thin film modules. 
Even if such a degressive system had spurred the intended cost-saving and 
technologically benign effects, they would have been counterbalanced by the EEG 
amendments of 2004 and 2008, which re-established the formerly higher feed-in tariff 
levels. For example, the 2009 tariffs for electricity produced from biomass and wind 
converters are above the levels of the year 2000 (Table 1). In other words, the repeated 
legal amendments have entirely destroyed even the modest cost-diminishing impacts of 
this degressive system.  
This demonstrates that this support mechanism is a classic example of an 
unsound energy policy that is highly prone to lobbyism. It is very unlikely that such 
government-directed programs, picking winners and losers, would yield a more efficient 
energy mix than what would be determined in the market absent massive government 
intervention (Michaels, Murphy 2009:5). 
5 Summary and Conclusion 
Although renewable energies have a potentially beneficial role to play as part of 
Germany’s energy portfolio, the commonly advanced argument that renewables confer a 
double dividend or “win-win solution” in the form of environmental stewardship and 
economic prosperity is disingenuous. In this article, we argue that Germany’s principal 
mechanism of supporting renewable technologies through feed-in tariffs, in fact, imposes 
high costs without any of the alleged positive impacts on emissions reductions, 
employment, energy security, or technological innovation.  
First, as a consequence of the prevailing coexistence of the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG) and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the increased use of 
renewable energy technologies triggered by the EEG does not imply any additional 
emission reductions beyond those already achieved by ETS alone, if the two instruments 
are not coordinated. This is in line with Morthorst (2003), who analyzes the promotion of 
renewable energy usage by alternative instruments using a three-country example. If not 
coordinated, this study’s results suggest that renewable support schemes are 
questionable climate policy instruments in the presence of the ETS.  
Second, numerous empirical studies have consistently shown the net employment 
balance to be zero or even negative in the long run, a consequence of the high 
opportunity cost of supporting renewable energy technologies. Indeed, it is most likely 
that whatever jobs are created by renewable energy promotion would vanish as soon as 
government support is terminated, leaving only Germany’s export sector to benefit from 
the possible continuation of renewables support in other countries such as the US. Third, 
rather than promoting energy security, the need for backup power from fossil fuels 
means that renewables increase Germany’s dependence on gas imports, most of which   20
come from Russia. And finally, the system of feed-in tariffs stifles competition among 
renewable energy producers and creates perverse incentives to lock into existing 
technologies. 
Hence, although Germany’s promotion of renewable energies is commonly 
portrayed in the media as setting a “shining example in providing a harvest for the 
world” (The Guardian 2007), we would instead regard the country’s experience as a 
cautionary tale of massively expensive environmental and energy policy that is devoid of 
economic and environmental benefits. As other European governments emulate Germany 
by ramping up their promotion of renewables, policy makers should scrutinize the logic of 
supporting energy sources that cannot compete on the market in the absence of 
government assistance.  
Nevertheless, government intervention can serve to support renewable energy 
technologies through other mechanisms that harness market incentives or correct for 
market failures. The European Trading Scheme, under which emissions certificates are 
traded, is one obvious example. Another is funding for research and development (R&D), 
which may compensate for underinvestment from the private sector owing to positive 
externalities. In the early stages of development of non-competitive technologies, for 
example, it appears to be more cost-effective to invest in R&D to achieve 
competitiveness, rather than to promote their large-scale production. This argument 
seems to be particularly relevant for solar cells, whose technological efficiency is widely 
known to be modest and, hence, should be first increased substantially via R&D.    21
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Electricity Prices and Net Cost of PV 




Feed-in Tariffs PV  Feed-in Tariffs Wind 
 €  Cents2005/kWh  € Cents/kWh  € Cents/kWh  € Cents/kWh 
2000 2.90 2.63 50.62 9.10 
2001 2.90 2.68 50.62 9.10 
2002 2.90 2.73 48.09 9.00 
2003 2.90 2.79 45.69 8.90 
2004 2.90 2.84 50.58 8.70 
2005 4.30 4.30 54.53 8.53 
2006 4.42 4.50 51.80 8.36 
2007 4.53 4.71 49.21 8.19 
2008 4.66 4.93 46.75 8.03 
2009 4.78 5.16 43.01 9.20 
2010 4.91 5.41 39.57 9.11 
2011 5.06 5.68 36.01 9.02 
2012 5.21 5.96 32.77 8.93 
2013 5.36 6.26 29.82 8.84 
2014 5.52 6.57 27.13 8.75 
2015 5.69 6.90 24.69 8.66 
2016 5.81 7.19 22.47 8.57 
2017 5.94 7.49 20.45 8.48 
2018 6.07 7.80 18.61 8.40 
2019 6.20 8.13 16.93 8.32 
2020 6.34 8.47 15.41 8.24 
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Table A2: Net Cost in € Cents2007 per kWh by Cohort for PV 
Cohort 2000  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000  55.13            
2001  53.99  53.99           
2002  52.87  52.87  50.08          
2003  51.78  51.78  49.04  46.44       
2004  50.70  50.70  48.02  45.47 50.66      
2005  48.19 48.19 45.56 43.06 48.15 52.26   
2006  47.04 47.04 44.46 42.01 47.00 51.03 48.24
2007  45.91 45.91 43.38 40.98 45.87 49.82 47.09 44.5
2008  44.79 44.79 42.31 39.96 44.75 48.62 45.95 43.41 41.00
2009  43.69 43.69 41.26 38.95 43.65 47.45 44.82 42.34 39.98 36.38
2010  42.61 42.61 40.22 37.96 42.57 46.29 43.72 41.27 38.96 35.43 32.19
2011  41.52 41.52 39.18 36.97 41.48 45.13 42.61 40.21 37.94 34.49 31.31
2012  40.45 40.45 38.16 35.98 40.41 43.99 41.52 39.17 36.94 33.56 30.44
2013  39.39 39.39 37.15 35.01 39.36 42.86 40.44 38.14 35.95 32.63 29.58
2014  38.35 38.35 36.15 34.06 38.31 41.75 39.37 37.12 34.98 31.72 28.73
2015  37.32 37.32 35.16 33.11 37.28 40.65 38.32 36.11 34.01 30.82 27.88
2016  36.34 36.34 34.23 32.22 36.31 39.61 37.33 35.16 33.34 30.22 27.34
2017  35.38 35.38 33.31 31.34 35.35 38.59 36.35 34.23 32.45 29.38 26.56
2018  34.44 34.44 32.40 30.47 34.40 37.58 35.39 33.55 31.58 28.57 25.80
2019  33.50 33.50 31.51 29.62 33.47 36.59 34.43 32.65 30.71 27.76 25.05
2020   32.58  30.63  28.77 32.55 35.61 33.50 31.76 29.85 26.96 24.30
2021     29.81  27.99 31.70 34.69 32.62 30.88 29.01 26.18 23.57
2022      27.22 30.85 33.79 31.76 30.05 28.23 25.45 22.89
2023       30.02 32.90 30.91 29.25 27.46 24.73 22.22
2024        32.03 30.08 28.45 26.70 24.02 21.57
2025         29.26 27.68 25.95 23.34 20.93
2026          26.90 25.21 22.65 20.28
2027       24.50 21.98 19.66
2028       21.32 19.05
2029       18.45
Bn kWh  0.064 0.052 0.072 0.125 0.244 0.725 0.938 1.280 1.310 1.600 1.880
Bn €  0.559 0.442 0.563 0.897 1.913 6.027 7.164 8.969 8.409 9.032 9.296
 
The specific net cost is calculated by subtracting actual or expected market prices of 
electricity from feed-in tariffs. While tariffs are fixed for each cohort of installed solar 
modules for a period of 20 years, of course, market prices change over time. Therefore, 
the specific net cost per kWh varies accordingly. The cumulative net cost induced by an 
individual cohort, reported in the last row, results from adding up the products of the real 
net cost per kWh and the solar electricity produced by each cohort displayed in the 
penultimate row. Net cost for wind is calculated in the same manner. 
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Table A3: Net Cost in € Cents2007 per kWh by Cohort for Wind Power (elevated 
tariff for 20 years) 
Cohort 2000  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000  7 . 4 4             
2001  7.23  7.23           
2002  7.03  7.03  6.92          
2003  6.83  6.83  6.72  6.62       
2004  6.64  6.64  6.53  6.43 6.22      
2005  4.99 4.99 4.89 4.79 4.58 4.40   
2006  4.69 4.69 4.59 4.49 4.28 4.11 3.94
2007  4.39 4.39 4.29 4.19 3.99 3.82 3.65 3.48
2008  4.08 4.08 3.99 3.89 3.69 3.53 3.36 3.19 3.04
2009  3.78 3.78 3.69 3.59 3.40 3.23 3.07 2.91 2.75 3.88
2010  3.48 3.48 3.39 3.29 3.10 2.94 2.78 2.62 2.47 3.57 3.49
2011  3.16 3.16 3.07 2.98 2.79 2.64 2.48 2.32 2.17 3.25 3.17
2012  2.84 2.84 2.75 2.66 2.48 2.33 2.17 2.02 1.87 2.93 2.85
2013  2.52 2.52 2.43 2.35 2.17 2.02 1.87 1.72 1.57 2.61 2.53
2014  2.20 2.20 2.11 2.03 1.85 1.71 1.56 1.41 1.27 2.29 2.21
2015  1.88 1.88 1.79 1.71 1.54 1.39 1.25 1.10 0.97 1.96 1.89
2016  1.60 1.60 1.52 1.43 1.27 1.12 0.98 0.84 0.71 1.40 1.61
2017  1.32 1.32 1.24 1.16 0.99 0.85 0.72 0.58 0.44 1.12 1.33
2018  1.04 1.04 0.96 0.88 0.72 0.59 0.45 0.31 0.18 0.84 1.05
2019  0.77 0.77 0.69 0.61 0.45 0.32 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.77
2020   0.49  0.41  0.33 0.18 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.50
2021     0.18  0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.27
2022      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
2023       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2024        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2025         0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2026          0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2027       0.00 0.00 0.00
2028       0.00 0.00
2029       0.00
Bn kWh  7.55 2.96 5.28 3.07 6.65 1.72 3.48 8.79 2.23 1.69 1.38
Bn €  5.884 2.100 3.281 1.645 2.906 0.603 0.990 1.982 0.389 0.450 0.299
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Table A4: Net Cost in € Cents2007 per kWh by Cohort for Wind Power (elevated 
tariff for five years) 
Cohort 2000  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000  7.44   
2001  7.23 7.23   
2002  7.03 7.03 6.92 
2003  6.83 6.83 6.72 6.62
2004  6.64 6.64 6.53 6.43 6.22
2005  1.97 4.99 4.89 4.79 4.58 4.40
2006  1.72 1.72 4.59 4.49 4.28 4.11 3.94
2007  1.48 1.48 1.39 4.19 3.99 3.82 3.65 3.48
2008  1.23 1.23 1.14 1.05 3.69 3.53 3.36 3.19 3.04
2009  0.99 0.99 0.90 0.80 0.32 3.23 3.07 2.91 2.75 3.88
2010  0.74 0.74 0.65 0.56 0.09 0.00 2.78 2.62 2.47 3.57 3.49
2011  0.47 0.47 0.39 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.32 2.17 3.25 3.17
2012  0.21 0.21 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.87 2.93 2.85
2013  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.61 2.53
2014  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.21
2015  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2016  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2017  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2018  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2019  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2020   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2021     0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2022      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2023      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2024      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2025      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2026      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2027      0.00 0.00 0.00
2028      0.00 0.00
2029      0.00
Bn kWh  7.55 2.96 5.28 3.07 6.65 1.72 3.48 8.79 2.23 1.69 1.38
Bn €  3.32 1.17 1.81 0.90 1.54 0.33 0.59 1.28 0.27 0.28 0.20  25
Table A5: Annual Net Cost in Bn €2007 per Annum and by Cohort for PV 
Cohort  2000 2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
2000  0.04               0.04 
2001  0.03  0.03             0.06 
2002  0.03  0.03  0.04           0.10 
2003  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.06          0.15 
2004  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.06  0.12         0.27 
2005  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.12  0.38        0.64 
2006  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11  0.37  0.45          1.08 
2007  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11  0.36  0.44  0.57        1.62 
2008  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11  0.35  0.43  0.56  0.54      2.12 
2009  0.03 0.02  0.03  0.05 0.11 0.34 0.42 0.54 0.52 0.58    2.65 
2010  0.03 0.02  0.03  0.05 0.10 0.34 0.41 0.53 0.51 0.57 0.61 3.19 
2011  0.03 0.02  0.03  0.05 0.10 0.33 0.40 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.59 3.10 
2012  0.03 0.02  0.03  0.04 0.10 0.32 0.39 0.50 0.48 0.54 0.57 3.02 
2013  0.03 0.02  0.03  0.04 0.10 0.31 0.38 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.56 2.94 
2014  0.02 0.02  0.03  0.04 0.09 0.30 0.37 0.48 0.46 0.51 0.54 2.86 
2015  0.02 0.02  0.03  0.04 0.09 0.29 0.36 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.52 2.78 
2016  0.02 0.02  0.02  0.04 0.09 0.29 0.35 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.51 2.73 
2017  0.02 0.02  0.02  0.04 0.09 0.28 0.34 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.50 2.65 
2018  0.02 0.02  0.02  0.04 0.08 0.27 0.33 0.43 0.41 0.46 0.49 2.58 
2019  0.02 0.02  0.02  0.04 0.08 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.40 0.44 0.47 2.51 
2020    0.02  0.02  0.04 0.08 0.26 0.32 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.46 2.42 
2021      0.02  0.04 0.08 0.25 0.31 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.44 2.33 
2022        0.03 0.08 0.25 0.30 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.43 2.25 
2023          0.07 0.24 0.29 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.42 2.15 
2024            0.23 0.28 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.41 2.02 
2025              0.28 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.39 1.74 
2026            0.34  0.33  0.36  0.38  1.42 
2027              0.32  0.35  0.37  1.04 
2028                0.34  0.36  0.70 
2029               0.35  0.35 
Total  0.56 0.44  0.56  0.90 1.91 6.03 7.16 8.97 8.41 9.03 9.30  53.27 
 
The columns in Table A5 inform about the net cost per cohort of annually installed 
modules, while the rows show the real net cost per year. A particularly striking result of 
the presentation is the dramatic cost increase related to the cohort installed in 2005, the 
year following the EEG amendment in 2004. Annual net cost for wind is calculated in the 
same manner.   26
Table A6: Annual Net Cost in Bn €2007 per Annum and by Cohort for Wind Power 
(elevated tariff for 20 years) 
Cohort  2000 2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
2000  0.56        0.69
2001  0.55  0.21       0.96
2002  0.53  0.21 0.37      1.43
2003  0.52  0.20 0.35  0.20     1.70
2004  0.50  0.20 0.34  0.20 0.41     2.28
2005  0.38  0.15 0.26  0.15 0.30 0.08     2.43
2006  0.35  0.14 0.24  0.14 0.28 0.07 0.14     2.72
2007  0.33  0.13 0.23  0.13 0.27 0.07 0.13 0.31     3.44
2008  0.31  0.12 0.21  0.12 0.25 0.06 0.12 0.28 0.07    3.62
2009  0.29 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.06  0.07    3.62
2010  0.26  0.10 0.18  0.10 0.21 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.05 3.62
2011  0.24  0.09 0.16  0.09 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.04 3.62
2012  0.21  0.08 0.15  0.08 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.04 0.05 0.04 3.62
2013  0.19  0.07 0.13  0.07 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.03 3.62
2014  0.17  0.07 0.11  0.06 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.03 3.62
2015  0.14  0.06 0.09  0.05 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.03 3.62
2016  0.12  0.05 0.08  0.04 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 3.62
2017  0.10  0.04 0.07  0.04 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 3.62
2018  0.08  0.03 0.05  0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 3.62
2019  0.06  0.02 0.04  0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 3.62
2020    0.01 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 2.93
2021    0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 2.66
2022      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.19
2023      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.92
2024      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34
2025      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.19
2026      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90
2027      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
2028       0.00 0.00 0.00
2029         0.00  0.00
Total  5.88  2.10 3.28  1.65 2.91 0.60 0.99 1.98 0.39 0.45 0.30  20.53
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Table A7: Annual Net Cost in Bn €2007 per Annum and by Cohort for Wind Power 
(elevated tariffs for five years) 
Cohort 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  Total 
2000  0.56       0.56 
2001  0.55 0.21        0.76 
2002  0.53 0.21 0.37      1.10 
2003  0.52 0.20 0.35 0.20    1.28 
2004  0.50 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.41   1.65 
2005  0.15 0.15 0.26 0.15 0.30 0.08   1.08 
2006  0.13 0.05 0.24 0.14 0.28 0.07 0.14   1.05 
2007  0.11 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.27 0.07 0.13 0.31   1.12 
2008  0.09 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.25 0.06 0.12 0.28 0.07   0.99 
2009  0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.06 0.07   0.74 
2010  0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.05  0.63 
2011  0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.04  0.43 
2012  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04  0.16 
2013  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03  0.08 
2014  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03  0.03 
2015  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2016  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2017  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2018  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2019  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2020   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2021     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2022       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2023       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2024       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2025       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2026       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2027       0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2028       0.00 0.00  0.00 
2029       0.00  0.00 
Total  3.32 1.17 1.81 0.90 1.54 0.33 0.59 1.28 0.27 0.28 0.20 11.67 
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Table A8 shows the cost of subsidisation in € Cents/kWh for the years 2000 through 2008 
that were calculated by dividing the total amount of feed-in tariffs by the gross electricity 
consumption. 
 
Table A8: Effect of Subsidization on Electricity Prices 
  Electricity Consumption  Feed-in Tariffs  Cost of Subsidization 
  Bn. kWh  Bn. Euro  € Cents/kWh 
2000 579.6  0.87  0.15 
2001 585.1  1.58  0.27 
2002 587.4  2.23  0.38 
2003 598.6  2.61  0.44 
2004 608.0  3.61  0.59 
2005 612.1  4.40  0.72 
2006 617.0  5.61  0.91 
2007 618.4  7.59  1.23 
2008 616.6  9.02  1.46 
Sources: AGEB (2009), BDEW (2001 through 2009) 
 
Total feed-in tariffs for each cohort of newly installed PV modules and wind converters 
are displayed in the last columns of Tables A9 through A11 and calculated by assuming 
that the same annual amount of electricity is produced over the whole subsidization 
period of 20 years. 
 









Tariffs, Mio € 
        Cumulated over 20 years 
          Nominal             Real 
          Bn €                 Bn €2007 
2000 64  50.62  32.4  0.648  0.671 
2001 52  50.62  26.3  0.526  0.494 
2002 72  48.09  34.6  0.692  0.638 
2003 125  45.69  57.1  1.142  1.031 
2004 244  50.58  123.4  2.468  2.184 
2005 725  54.53  395.3  7.906  6.680 
2006 938  51.80  485.9  9.717  8.266 
2007 1,280  49.21  629.9  12.598  10.506 
2008 1,310  46.75  612.4  12.248  10.014 
Total burden for past installations:  47.945  40.484 
2009 1,600  43.01  688.2  13.764  11.032 
2010 1,880  39.57  743.9  14.878  11.692 
Total burden at the end of 2010:  76.587  63.208 
Note: Column 1: 2000-2008: BMU (2009a), 2009-2010: SARASIN (2007). Column 2: Feed-in tariff for PV in € 
cents per kWh. Column 3: Product of Column 1 and 2. Column 4: Column 3 times 20. Column 5: Inflation-
corrected figures of Column 4 using a rate of 2%. 
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Feed-in Tariff, € 
Cents/kWh 
 






2000 7.55  9.10  13.74  13.16 
2001 2.96  9.10  5.39  5.06 
2002 5.28  9.00  9.50  8.75 
2003 3.07  8.90  5.47  4.94 
2004 6.65  8.70  11.57  10.24 
2005 1.72  8.53  2.93  2.55 
2006 3.48  8.36  5.82  4.95 
2007 8.79  8.19  14.40  12.01 
2008 2.23  8.03  3.58  2.93 
Total burden for past installations:  72.40  64.59
2009 1.69  9.20  3.12  2.50 
2010 1.38  9.11  2.51  1.97 
Total burden at the end of 2010:  78.03  69.06
Note: Column 1: 2000-2008: BMU (2009a), 2009-2010: BMU (2008), Column 2: Feed-in tariff for PV in € 
cents per kWh. Column 3: Product of Column 1 and 2. Column 4: Column 3 times 20. Column 5: Inflation-
corrected figures of Column 4 using a rate of 2%. 
 
Table A11: Total feed-in tariffs for Wind Power (elevated tariff for first five 
years) 
 Annual  Increase,   
 
Feed-in Tariff,  
first 5 years,  
 
Feed-in Tariff, 
last 15 years,  
Cumulated over 20 years 
 
  Mio kWh  € Cents/kWh  € Cents/kWh  Bn. €  Bn. €2007 
2000  7.55 9.10 6.19  10.45  10.17 
2001  2.96 9.10 6.19  4.09  3.91 
2002  5.28 9.00 6.10  7.20  6.74 
2003  3.07 8.90 6.00  4.13  3.79 
2004  6.65 8.70 5.50  8.38  7.56 
2005  1.72 8.53 5.39  2.12  1.88 
2006  3.48 8.36 5.28  4.21  3.65 
2007  8.79 8.19 5.17  10.42  8.86 
2008  2.23 8.03 5.07  2.59  2.16 
Total burden for past installations:  53.59  48.72
2009  1.69 9.20 5.02  2.05  1.69 
2010  1.38 9.11 4.97  1.65  1.33 
Total burden at the end of 2010:  57.29  51.74
Note: Column 1: 2000-2008: BMU (2009a), 2009-2010: BMU (2008), Column 2: Feed-in tariff for PV in € cents 
per kWh. Column 3: Product of Column 1 and 2. Column 4: Column 3 times 20. Column 5: Inflation-corrected 
figures of Column 4 using a rate of 2%. 
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